Skip to content
anew
09 · Documentation

Security and trust

Trust assumptions, what each party could do to you, the keys, the failure modes, and what nobody audited.

Anew holds no funds and deploys no contract, so no Anew key can move your money. The trust you would place in a custodian goes to three other places instead: NEAR Intents, the code the site serves, and your own browser. This page lists each party, what it could do to you, and what nobody has audited.

Who you trust, and for what

Party You trust it to If it fails
Zcash keep the shielded pool sound you lose privacy, and your funds stay where they are
NEAR Intents 1Click and its solvers settle the swap within the 1% slippage tolerance, or refund it your ZEC sits at a deposit address that NEAR Intents controls until it settles or refunds
The Anew website code put your address in the quote, and keep fresh keys in your browser a compromised site could quote its own address, or read the keys it stored
Your browser and its extensions protect localStorage and the backup file anyone who reads the key can empty the address
The hosting platform serve the code Anew deployed a compromised host means a compromised site; its standard logs record your requests
The RPC operator give true answers to reads and pass your transactions on a false answer could hide an address's past from the history check or show a wrong balance
Privy, if it loads handle sign-in it sees your IP address and wallet address, and your email if you sign in with one
The launch venue, after launch hold the market for $ANEW the same trust any buyer there takes; planned

The site's code, and how to check it

The quote is only as honest as the page that asks for it. A compromised deployment could send 1Click a quote with its own address as recipient while showing yours on screen. The same code makes and stores fresh keys, so a compromised deployment could also read them.

Three checks cover the recipient, and a fourth step covers the key.

  1. The page's own check. On each status check, the deposit screen reads the recipient and the destination asset that NEAR Intents recorded for the deposit address. It shows "NEAR Intents confirms the payout goes to 0x…, ETH on Robinhood Chain" when both match your choice, and a red Do not send. alert when either differs. This catches a bad quote from a bug or from a tampered server route. The check runs in the site's own code, though, so a deployment compromised end to end could fake it.
  2. The check without Anew. The Check it yourself link opens the raw public status at 1Click. Before you trust it, confirm that it points to https://1click.chaindefuser.com/v0/status?depositAddress= followed by your deposit address, or type that URL yourself. The answer carries the original quote request, and its recipient must be your address. This request shows 1Click your IP address next to the deposit address; a VPN or Tor avoids that.
  3. The explorer, afterwards. Once the swap settles, https://explorer.near-intents.org/transactions/<deposit address> shows the same recipient, and the payout appears at your address on https://robin.etherscan.io.
  4. The key. After the trip, import the key from the backup file into a wallet you trust, and clear this site's data from the browser. A connected or pasted address keeps the key out of the page from the start, at the cost of whatever history that address carries.

The Start page also shows the receiving address before the quote and again on the order screen. That display catches your own typing mistakes. A compromised page controls it too.

Keys

Key or value Lives Controls If it leaks
Fresh address private key your browser's localStorage (anew.keys) and the backup file the ETH at that address anyone can empty the address
ONECLICK_JWT (optional) server environment no funds someone could request quotes under Anew's partner key; the operator rotates it
ANEW_FEE_RECIPIENT, ANEW_FEE_BPS server environment where Anew's fee goes, and how much a changed value moves Anew's fee, within the 200 bps cap in code; user funds stay where they are
Privy App ID public, in the page nothing nothing; the App ID is public by design

Anew has no App Secret, no server wallet, no deployer key and no contract owner key.

What the code checks for you

  • The page accepts a refund address only if it passes base58check with the Zcash mainnet prefixes and the double SHA-256 checksum. It refuses shielded and TEX addresses and says why.
  • A connected or pasted address goes through the history check on chain 4663, and a past needs an explicit Use it anyway.
  • The Start page will not continue with a fresh address until you confirm you saved its key, and it does not offer a fresh address again once it has received.
  • The Start page holds each trip between 0.01 and 2 ZEC.
  • The deposit screen compares the recorded recipient and asset with your choice on each status check.
  • The Content Security Policy limits the page's connections to itself, the RPC and the hosts Privy and WalletConnect need.
  • The quote route caps each connection at thirty quotes a minute.
  • Privy runs with the App ID alone, and Anew calls no Privy server API.
  • The partner key and the fee settings stay on the server.

Failure modes, and where the money is

Failure The money sits Your next step
You never send in your wallet; nothing moved start a new trip when you are ready
Deposit sent after the thirty-minute deadline with NEAR Intents, which documents a refund minus the refund fee; not observed live watch the status; send as soon as the address appears
Solvers cannot fill, or the price moves past 1% back at your refund address after the deadline, minus the refund fee nothing
Deposit below the quote with NEAR Intents, which documents a refund after the deadline, minus the refund fee watch the status; send exact amounts in one transaction
ZEC sent from another network not the asset the quote asked for; recovery uncertain send native ZEC on Zcash only
A pasted exchange address that does not support Robinhood Chain at that address on Robinhood Chain, possibly beyond reach paste an address whose key you hold
FAILED with NEAR Intents keep the deposit address
A red Do not send. alert in your wallet, if you heed it send nothing; start a new trip
Anew's site goes down mid-trip with NEAR Intents, then at your address read the 1Click status by deposit address; the swap does not depend on Anew's site
The direct rail stops quoting in your wallet; no trip starts wait, and watch the Stats page
Browser data cleared at your address import the key from the backup file
Backup lost and browser data cleared at your address, out of reach nothing; Anew holds no copy
RPC unreachable at your address the Hold page cannot read or send until the RPC returns

Audits

Nobody has audited Anew. The research behind these docs sent no funds through Anew. Its market numbers come from 1Click quotes observed on 2026-09-22, and its settlement evidence comes from completed ZEC swaps into Robinhood Chain by other users, checked the same day.

If you find a problem, write to the X account linked in the footer.