Privacy

Anew makes one privacy claim: the road is traceable from your receiving address back to one deshielding transaction on Zcash, and not from that transaction to you. The claim leaves amounts and timing in view, and it covers nothing the address does later.

The observers

Take the road one step at a time and list who sees what.

On Zcash

You send from a shielded balance to a transparent deposit address. Zcash calls this a deshielding transaction, and the chain shows:

• the amount that arrived at the transparent address,
• the transparent address itself,
• the time.

The sending address, your balance and your earlier transactions stay in the shielded pool. Anew adds nothing to that protection and takes nothing from it.

The deposit address is recognizable as a NEAR Intents deposit address. A Zcash observer learns that someone deshielded X ZEC into a NEAR Intents swap at time T, and nothing about who.

A refund travels the other way in the open. It lands at your transparent refund address, so the refunded amount and that address are public on Zcash.

At NEAR Intents

1Click sees the deposit, the quote, the refund address, the recipient, and the IP address of whoever asked for the quote. For quotes made through Anew, that IP address belongs to Anew's server, which forwards the request. The page makes no call to NEAR Intents from your browser, unless you open the Check it yourself link. 1Click does not see the shielded sender.

NEAR Intents publishes swap history through its explorer, so a swap of X ZEC into ETH on Robinhood Chain, paid to your address, is public there, at https://explorer.near-intents.org/transactions/<deposit address>. The 1Click status for a deposit address is public too, with no key needed: anyone who has the deposit address, and the Zcash chain shows it, can read the quote behind it, amounts, recipient and refund address included. A refund address that ever received from an exchange account in your name therefore ties the trip to that name in public.

At Anew's server and its host

Anew's server forwards quote, status and deposit requests and keeps no copy of them. It sees your IP address, as any website does. In a live quote request it also sees your receiving address and your refund address, which it passes to 1Click. The quote limiter keeps a count per connection in memory to cap quotes at thirty a minute, and writes nothing to disk.

The hosting platform keeps its standard request logs. The status route carries the deposit address in its URL (/api/status?d=…), so a log that records full URLs pairs your IP address with that deposit address, and through it with the swap. Treat those logs as a record that exists.

The optional transaction id you can paste after sending adds no new link: the Zcash chain already ties that transaction to the deposit address.

A VPN or Tor changes the IP address that the server, the host, the RPC operator and Privy see. It changes nothing on any chain.

On Robinhood Chain

Everything here is public: the ETH arriving at your address from the solver's payout, and everything the address does afterwards. In the payouts checked on 2026-09-22, the ETH came as a plain transfer from one address that fills this route, so anyone who recognises that address can see at a glance that yours was funded through NEAR Intents. An observer can walk back from the address: the payout, then the NEAR Intents swap on its explorer, then the deposit address on Zcash, then the deshielding transaction.

The walk ends there. The deshield shows no sender, and each step back from your address stops at some shielded balance that sent X ZEC.

The RPC operator

Your browser reads chain 4663 from the public RPC. Its operator sees your IP address and the addresses the page reads: the receiving address during the history check, and your fresh addresses and any connected wallet on the Hold page. Those reads can tie your IP address to a fresh address.

Privy

The Privy SDK loads on the Start and Hold pages, when you hover over, focus or click the sign-in button in the header, and on any page once this browser holds a Privy session from an earlier sign-in. Once loaded, it can contact Privy's servers, which then see your IP address. If you connect a wallet, Privy sees its address, and if you sign in with email, Privy sees the email. Privy keeps its own storage and iframes in your browser. A connection through WalletConnect also passes through WalletConnect's servers.

Your browser

Fresh keys sit under anew.keys and orders under anew.orders in localStorage. Anyone with access to your browser profile can read them, and so can any code that runs on the site's origin. Security covers the second case.

The claim, in exact terms

The road is traceable from the receiving address back to the deshielding transaction, and not from that transaction to a person. The statement is narrow, and Anew defends that statement alone: the receiving address has no owner that the chain can name.

Three things fall outside it.

• Later activity. Everything the address does after the ETH arrives is public, as on any EVM chain.
• Amounts and timing. Anew hides neither. Anyone who reads both chains can pair a deshield with a payout of matching size a few minutes later.
• Parties off chain. 1Click, Anew's server and host, the RPC operator and Privy each see a piece: an IP address, a recipient, a refund address, a deposit address. None of them sees the shielded sender, yet the pieces joined together can tie an IP address to a receiving address.

Anew's own weak points

The site's code is the first. A compromised deployment could put its own address in the quote, or read the fresh keys it stored. It could not learn your shielded sender. On each status check the deposit screen reads the recipient that NEAR Intents recorded for the deposit address, and the Check it yourself link opens the same record at 1Click without Anew. Security explains how far that check reaches.

The server and its host are the second. They see your IP address, the addresses in your quote requests and the deposit address in each status request. The server keeps no copy; the host keeps its standard logs.

Five ways you can break it

Anew cannot prevent these. It can name them.

1. Reusing the receiving address. If the receiving address ever touched a wallet tied to you, anyone can tie the trip to you. Receive each trip at a fresh address.
2. Reusing a refund address linked to an exchange. A transparent address that received from an exchange account in your name carries that name into a record anyone can read. Make a new one for each trip.
3. Round amounts at regular times. Deshield the same round amount at the same hour each week, receive the matching ETH minutes later, and an observer needs no logs to join the two. Vary the amount and the time.
4. Talking. A post about the trip next to a wallet screenshot, from an account with your name, undoes the rest of this list.
5. Sending from a transparent balance. ZEC that never entered the shielded pool leaves no deshield to hide behind, and its history is as open as a Bitcoin address's. Shield first, wait, then send.

What Anew keeps

Anew has no accounts of its own and asks for no email. It loads no analytics scripts, sets no cookies and keeps no list of orders on any server. Your browser holds two localStorage keys: anew.orders, so that a closed tab does not lose an order, and anew.keys, so that the Hold page can reach your fresh addresses. Clearing the site's data removes both, so download each key's backup first. Privy, if it loads, keeps its own storage.